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        Xi Jinping is widely seen as being China’s most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping and perhaps
since Mao. While it is right and prudent to focus on what Xi says and does (and loudly says that he
wants), there is a danger that analysis of China’s trajectory and international impact is becoming too Xi-
centric. Even if observers are not specifically fixated on what Xi as an individual wants, they may
nevertheless be overly focussed on the goals and ambitions of the central Chinese state, and overlook
the interests and objectives of actors below the national level.  
           Take the expansion of Chinese overseas investment as an example. The actions of Chinese
companies overseas are often perceived as illustrations of Chinese economic statecraft, with companies
acting on behalf of the state to attain strategic objectives. Some State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have
indeed invested overseas with financial and diplomatic support from the government to gain access to
energy and other resources that the state has targeted as essential to maintain Chinese economic
security. Such investment in developing countries—including a number of politically unstable ones—
was very much a feature of the early wave of Chinese overseas investment in the new millennium. And
even as other enterprises and actors become more active in overseas investment projects around the
world, state priorities and objectives remained important. It was a shift in the Chinese overseas
investment regulatory regime, for example, that not so much encouraged as allowed for a new wave of
investment seeking advanced technologies and markets from smaller companies. And as the
introduction of new Chinese controls on some investment in sporting, entertainment and real estate
projects in 2017 showed, the state can and does act to prevent activity is not deemed to be in the
national interest.  
           But just because some Chinese SOEs act as strategic agents of the central state, this does not mean
that all of them do. Quite simply, commercial objectives play their part, too. The profit motive is even
driving some investments by SOEs in energy sectors. Moreover, when we talk about the Chinese state, it
is important to distinguish between different parts of that state. The power to approve and/or register
overseas investment projects has been gradually simplified and devolved. From 2014, only mega-
projects (of over US$1 billion) or those in sensitive areas need approval rather than simply being filed
and registered, with local governments responsible for investments of under US$300 million. A range
of other mechanisms has also been introduced to help smaller enterprises go overseas and move up
global value chains. 
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           One consequence has been an increase in the significance of the developed world as the main
target of Chinese investment activities. Another is a shift in who is investing. Overseas attention
seems to remain focussed on what is done by large Chinese companies – be they SOEs or large
private ones like Huawei – and their major acquisitions (such as ChemChina’s takeover of Sygenta in
2017). This is entirely understandable. However, according to a report by the National Development
and Reform Commission (China’s main economic management and planning agency), while
investments by local enterprises only accounted for about 13 per cent of the total value in 2006, they
had risen to nearly 90 per cent by 2016. There is a growing consensus among China watchers that
local enterprises have become the backbone of China’s outgoing foreign investment. 
           By focussing on the apex of the Chinese political system, we too easily overlook the
importance of local governments.  What they want – and what they want varies considerably from
place to place – has become a key driver of Chinese international economic interactions. Their
collective behaviour will also be a key determinant of how China’s economy performs in coming
years, both at home and overseas. For example, the vast majority of Chinese SOEs are not owned by
the central government, or even by China’s provincial level governments, but are instead registered
by governments below the provincial level. It is this local level of the administrative hierarchy that
owns and controls land. (Selling and re-selling land use rights are a key source of local government
income.) This is where most Chinese government debt is located and will come due.  
           In addition, government officials in counties, townships, and prefectures are the
representatives of the state whom most Chinese people interact with in their daily lives. How they
deliver public services, how they raise money, how they distribute contracts, and so on will
collectively be a key determinant of both how future economic change plays out in China, and also
how the Chinese people respond to it. What they do collectively will also be a key determinant of
what happens to China’s international investment profile in the future. For example, China’s Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) has drawn the attention of many local governments, which are seeking to
utilise Xi’s enthusiasm for the project to lever their own local agendas.  
           Those in the Beijing foreign policy establishment will often express concern that what some
Chinese do overseas reflects badly on the country as a whole. If they over-zealously pursue their own
narrow economic objectives, then they can undermine the broader political objective of establishing
an idea of China as a new type of great power. It is fair to say that it is not just small or locally owned
investors that have resulted in a push-back against Chinese investment projects in places like
Myanmar. But they certainly play their part. Xi’s economic reform agenda in his second term seems
at least in part intended to assert the primacy of central (and his) economic objectives. This reform
agenda is primarily adopted for domestic reasons, but it could affect what local companies do
overseas as well. 
           Xi’s own personal agenda is hugely significant. But we should not assume that his is the only
Chinese interest or objective, or that all Chinese overseas investment is part of a coordinated and
clearly organised central state strategy. Sometimes it is. But other actors’ interests and objectives are
often crucial determinants, too. Xi might be in charge, but the Chinese political economy is too big
and too diverse for even the central government as a whole to be in day-to-day control of
everything. 
APB Series Founding Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye | APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any
organization with which the author is affiliated. 
The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through
cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical
issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options.  
"Xi might be in
charge, but the
Chinese political
economy is too big
and too diverse for
even the central
government as a
whole to be in day-
to-day control of
everything." 
Professor Shaun Breslin is Leverhulme Major Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Studies and
Co-Editor of The Pacific Review at the University of Warwick. She can be contacted at iskaewkamol@ntu.edu.sg. 
